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In 2008, two books were published about ἁρμονία (harmony) in an-
cient Greece. We must admit that until then no book had dealt with
the question of ἁρμονία so precisely as these books, which are con-
sequently welcome in this research field of ancient Greek philosophy.
The Science of Harmonics in Classical Greece by Andrew Barker,
who is well known as a great specialist of ancient Greek music, ex-
amines the Greek science of music in classical times: its purpose is
to understand how the ancient Greeks dealt with questions of musi-
cology in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Barker’s interest is with
musical theory. So we may underline two important differences with
the book by A.-G.Wersinger.1 First, she is a philosopher, not a mu-
sicologist; and the concept of ἁρμονία is, for her, not limited to mu-
sic. Second, she aims at understanding how the notion of ἁρμονία
was born in Greece and developed from its beginnings until classical
times, though mainly in archaic times. In my view, both books are
complementary and very important for modern scholars who study
philosophy and musicology as well as mathematics, because all of
these sciences were studied together in antiquity.
Wersinger’s book presents two big difficulties that she herself
points out. Most archaic Greek texts (except Homer’s and Hesiod’s
epics) are fragmentary, and so her project entails reconstructing a
whole way of thinking largely from ashes. But this is even more prob-
lematic than it seems: these fragments are mostly extracts chosen
and quoted by later ancient authors, e.g., Plato or Aristotle. Con-
sequently, we cannot always be sure that these texts were quoted
The table of contents of this book can be found on the editor’s website,1
http://www.millon. com/collections/histoire/horos/spheretm.html.
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accurately and fairly: ancient authors typically want to prove some-
thing particular and so may edit or even falsify their sources. But
Wersinger is conscious of these problems and is very cautious, so that
her method and her results are absolutely convincing.
Wersinger considers the evolution of the notion of ἁρμονία in
Greek thought. She proceeds by studying a different philosopher
or philosophy in each chapter, broadly moving forward in time. The
book itself is divided into two parts answering to the title: the sphere
and the interval. In this way, the author aims to prove that this dis-
tinction lets us see two ways of understanding ἁρμονία in ancient
Greece. As she says: ‘at the beginning, the scheme of ἁρμονία is the
circle and the infinite signifies perfect circularity; in the end, the infi-
nite has become the interval between more and less, whereas ἁρμονία
is identified with limit and unity’ [11]. But we have to be very careful
with the notions of Presocratic philosophy, since, for many of these
notions, there are no equivalent words in our modern languages.
As expected, the author begins with ἁρμονία in Homer’s epics.
Of course, there is not any theory of ἁρμονία in archaic poetry. But
Wersinger succeeds in finding many clues in descriptions of ‘archae-
ological’ objects (wheel, shield) and ritual events (the crane’s dance,
also called the dance of the labyrinth). We might think that ἁρμονία
is to be seen in a perfect circle, but it was not actually so in those
times: ἁρμονία was viewed more narrowly as the junction between
both ends of the circle. There is a bond, a connection, but it is in-
visible. Aristotle says that the circle is infinite because there is not
any end. For archaic writers, the circle is infinite in that there is no
join for the eye to see. Consequently, the circle, formed by bending a
straight line so that its ends meet, is, like ἁρμονία, the result of two
main processes: tension and articulation. These terms belong first
to physiology: body is at once fibrous or stringy (μέλος) and articu-
lated into limbs (γυῖα). In Greece, a μέλος is also music or melody.
Each sound has a particular tension, an inflection or pitch; it is not
yet considered as a part of a musical interval. For archaic poets,
ἁρμονία results from an articulation of sounds, whereas Pythagoras’
and Aristotle’s schools describe it as a succession of intervals.
Empedocles, the first of the Presocratic philosophers, uses the
same terminology as Homer but in a new framework. For Homer, the
σῶμα is a corpse; whereas for Empedocles it is a body. Articulation
214 Aestimatio
and tension are no longer only properties of body but of a whole
nature. For Empedocles, body is a degree of ἁρμονία because it
forms a unity due to the mutual articulation of members and organs;
Homer, however, thinks body is made of multiplicity. Wersinger no-
tices opportunely that Empedocles’ theory of ἁρμονία appears in his
poetry, what she calls ‘harmonization ofmelea’ [67]: it corresponds to
repetition of set expressions, which characterizes Empedocles’ style.
Repetition builds a circle, a unity between all the verses of a poem:
it is composed of several important moments comparable to peaks.
Repetition is like a path that connects all the summits. There is
another relevant metaphor in Empedocles’ poems, the κώδων [see
Diels and Kranz 1951–1952, 31B99]. The κώδων is a Greek bell, a
percussion instrument, and at the same time a trumpet bell; it is
also for Empedocles the bell in the ear which transfers sounds inside
the head. It is not only a resonator but also a musical instrument
which plays what it has heard. So there is repetition. Unity is the
purest form of ἁρμονία but it is not its principle: ἁρμονία is a kind
of net made of juxtaposition.
Heraclitus introduces a new concept into the definition of ἁρμο-
νία: community. The junction of both ends of a circle is thought of
as a union with common elements, a kind of fastening. In Homer’s
epics, a ἀρμονία could be a pact or agreement: Heraclitus shows that
ἀρμονία forms a community of interests in politics or a community of
principles in ontology. Like his predecessors, he thinks that infinity
is in fact invisibility but for him it is due to density: there is a hidden
circularity in universe. Therefore, contraries are bound together like
day and night in the circle of 24 hours. Heraclitus’ reflection about
ἁρμονία is first a reflection about astronomy, particularly the transi-
tion between day and night. Heraclitus’ astronomy rests on four new
propositions:
◦ the Sun’s journey through the sky no longer fixes the limits of
night and day;
◦ the Sun no longer goes under the Earth (during the night);
◦ there is not any exclusive difference between day and night (only
a variation of hot and cold exhalations, whose ratio is to be under-
stood in relation to distance from the Sun); and
◦ the Sun does not form a unity.
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Night and day are like tenon and mortise, bound together in them-
selves. Consequently, Heraclitus builds a theory of the whole uni-
verse by organizing the four elements in a circle [see Diels and Kranz
1951–1952, 22B31]: fire is changed into water by condensation, wa-
ter into earth and air by solidification, and then earth into water
by dissolution, water into fire by rarefaction. In fact, it is a circle
of fire, which appears to be the most important element in Heracli-
tus’ system. Wersinger examines too a fragment about music, Diels
and Kranz 1951–1952, 22B10, which refers to the heptachord, the
seven-note system of the seven-stringed lyre in archaic times. This
heptachord is joined in that the seven notes follow one another with-
out any ‘break’—in our modern notation, this would be
ABCDEFG or CDEFGAB.
In this case, the octave is not heard and so is ‘invisible’; but if you re-
store the missing note, you obtain a circle and thus ἁρμονία. Archaic
lyres had seven strings: three of them were pegged to the right, four
to the left. So there is a difference: concordance (the octave) comes
from difference. In fact, the heptachord (the octachord with the in-
visible note) is made of two tetrachords. The central note (mese) is
common to both: from this community you have musical ἁρμονία
(by adding the invisible note). ἁρμονία is at once visible and invisi-
ble and that is Heraclitus’ style: it is made of argumentative prose
(where the theory of ἁρμονία is visible) and aphorisms (where it is
invisible).
A new conception of the circle may be found in Parmenides’
fragments. As before, the circle is formed by the junction of two
ends; but it is also geometrically defined in relation to its center, the
circumference being conceived as a limit. So Parmenides poses an
ontological problem: being is something limited. Empedocles and
Heraclitus had their own style: Parmenides for his part composes
many circles and each of them has a center. Limit is associated with
identity and indivisibility: limit contains and maintains each being.
It does not mean that limit is between more and less because that
would amount to saying that being is made of multiplicity, which is
not possible for Parmenides. If being were a multiplicity, it would
disappear. Only later is there limit between more and less, as far as
being able to grow or shrink. From Homer to Parmenides, the idea
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of the circle has been retained to define ἁρμονία. But the nature
of the junction of both ends has been interpreted differently: for
Parmenides, this union is a kind of universal binder, a coalescence
which permits integrity.
The second part of Wersinger’s book is devoted to the notion of
interval and how the archaic vision of harmony as circle was changed
into that new notion. Wersinger thinks that the missing link is to
be found in Anaximander’s philosophy. There is only one relevant
fragment [Diels and Kranz 1951–1952, 12B1], which Wersinger ana-
lyzes grammatically, morphologically, and philologically. For Anaxi-
mander, the ἄpiειρον (infinite) is at the beginning of generation, but
there is no circle because the philosopher does not speak of corrup-
tion at the end of being. He invents the notion of γόνιμον, that
is, the separation of two opposite qualities from the ἄpiειρον. The
ἄpiειρον is a kind of ‘panspermic’ marrow. It combines the forces of
differentiation and combination, Chaos and Eros. In consequence, it
is the model of ἁρμονία, like sap, with a circular and discriminatory
structure—for the sap of a tree both creates a living periphery and
causes death (wood) at the center, thus combining two contraries,
life and death, to form a tree. This is not the model of κόσμος which
is an arrangement of different astral wheels with their hubs on the
same line: so center is very important. In Homer’s epics, the center
is the place of conflict, of hard battle; in Anaximander’s philosophy,
it is the place of measure, of symmetry and balance. The whole uni-
verse is organized in circles, and so by the number three, which is in
fact the best approximation at that time of the number pi. Wersinger
notices that Anaximander’s reflection is inspired by Doric architec-
ture, particularly the circular drums of a column. So Anaximander
theorizes two forms of ἁρμονία: ἄpiειρον (where ἁρμονία combines
opposites) and κόσμος (where ἁρμονία is symmetry).
The Pythagorean school introduces its conception of number
into the problematic of ἁρμονία. But modern scholars have to un-
derstand properly what number represents in those times: Is it the
thing itself or just an instrument of knowledge? Wersinger answers
that Pythagorean philosophers do not revere numbers but think that
numbers are in a relationship with piαθός (affection of being). So they
said that the whole sky is ἁρμονία and number: there is the rhythm
of the stars’ movement and the ἁρμονία of astral sounds. There are
two ways of interpreting numbers: the ‘arithmo-geometric’ one and
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the ‘logistic’ one. The first corresponds to the theory of ψῆφοι in
which the little stones by which the ancient Greeks voted are used to
figure numbers. The number 5, for example, is figured by five ψῆφοι
which are arranged in two parallel lines each of two stones with the
remaining stone in between the lines, thus signifying that this num-
ber is odd. So you have a constellation of identical arithmetic units.
The second model, the ‘logistic one’, corresponds to the theory of
λόγοι (ratios). A unit is composed of limit and ἄpiειρον: the best
example is that of the λογοὶ ἐpiίμόριοι, superparticular ratios defined
by the form (n+1):n (where n is a whole number). One part can be
measured and another one cannot. The first model seems to ignore
ἄpiειρον. That is why Zeno’s argument about Achilles and the tor-
toise is against this arithmo-geometric interpretation: for Zeno, being
is continuous and arithmo-geometric numbers cannot reveal that con-
tinuity. The question is what is between two units? Between two op-
posites? Many Pythagoreans, therefore, invented a table where there
are two columns of absolute opposites, the συστοιχίαι. But, for other
Pythagoreans, there is between beings a διάστημα, an interval, which
lets one distinguish various fields in the ἄpiειρον. As far as numbers
are concerned, there is the ‘geometric progression’, but Archytas the-
orized two others: the arithmetic and the harmonic. Intervals may
vary according to one’s point of view. Intervals can limit or be infi-
nite, as observed in music. The problem is to divide the tetrachord:
the tetrachord is delimited by the interval of a fourth, which in mod-
ern terms is viewed as two tones and a half; for the Pythagoreans,
the fourth is composed of two tones (9:8) and a λεῖμμα, literally, the
rest of the interval (which is only approximately a half tone).2 So an
interval can be limiting (the tone, 9:8) or indefinite (the λεῖμμα).
Infinite and limit are constitutive of the circle for Pythagoreans:
circumference is infinite whereas radius is limiting. Consequently, a
sphere, like a circle, is created by an interval, in the relationship be-
tween the center and periphery. Many of them consider that the sky
dome results from ‘pulling’ the external curve to the center by the
means of the radius. However, the philosopher Philolaus held that
the universe (κόσμος) is like a sphere: it results from harmonization
of the Indefinite (τὸ ἄpiειρον). The ἄpiειρον is divided to produce
the center of a spherical space: the center is made of fire and the
The ratio of this interval, 256:243, is superpartient.2
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periphery of air, the envelop of sky. To harmonize is to divide the
ἄpiειρον (which is made of more and less) into intervals that demar-
cate degrees. So Wersinger thinks that Philolaus is a Pythagorean
in so far as he holds that ἁρμονία combines opposites, but that he
departs from that school in understanding that intervals do not de-
finitively limit ἄpiειρον: this is particularly clear in his conception of
music. There is an interval between high-pitched tones and the low
register. But inside this interval, there are other intervals and so on:
interval is at once infinite and limited. As we have seen, Pythagore-
ans conceived music as mathematical ratios and a particular ratio is
associated with each interval. All intervals are not fixed: the diesis,
for example, is only approximately a half-tone. Therefore, limit and
ἄpiειρον are always in a relationship with one another. This relation-
ship permits ἁρμονία: Philolaus is said to have invented the disjunct
heptachord, also called ‘Pythagoras’ octachord’. In the disjunct hep-
tachord, the highest-pitched note (the nete) is one tone higher than in
the conjunct heptachord; so Philolaus creates a bigger interval from
the mese to produce the octave with only seven notes (heptachord).
But it is not yet the standard octachord because one note is ‘mute’
due to the organization of octave. For Philolaus, the octave was
EFGABCD.
Since he wanted to have an octave with only seven notes, he created
the sequence
EFGABD
so that the C is mute and there is a tone and half between B and D.
Philolaus theorizes superparticular ratios from the octave, which
is typically for him musical ἁρμονία. The octave is made of a fourth
and a fifth. All these intervals have for Pythagoreans superparticular
ratios: the octave is 2:1; the fourth, 4:3; and the fifth, 3:2. The tone
articulates the octave, as far as it is the link between two fourths,
and so the difference between the fifth and the fourth, a difference
obtained by division (3:2/4:3 :: 9:8). The octave is like a circle whose
center is the mese, the central note which creates limit; both extrem-
ities of the octave are also limits. The infinite is the interval which
envelops the transition from conjunct to disjunct heptachord: one
interval persists in another during transition. In this case, there is a
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‘redistribution’ of notes inside the second tetrachord so as to main-
tain the same number of notes in a bigger interval. Therefore, the
disjunct heptachord, Philolaus’ ἁρμονία, is made of limits and ἄpiει-
ρον (tonic intervals and dieseis). For Wersinger, Philolaus’ ἄpiειρον
is ‘active diversification’ [301]: there are unlimited possibilities to
place dieseis inside the tetrachord.
Archytas has yet another point of view: he wants to measure all
the differences and thinks that whole universe is made of proportions,
like the great sculptor Polyclitus in his Canon: all the measures of
the human body are proportional to the smallest phalanx in the little
finger. But Archytas fails to find a geometrical average in the octave:
he can only find an approximation, because it is in fact
√
2. It is
typically the problem of ἄpiειρον. For Archytas, the ἄpiειρον is not
measurable: there is no symmetry or visible proportionality. Since
he does not want to see ἄpiειρον in melodic ἁρμονία, he has a hard
problem to solve. However, Philolaus admits the ἄpiειρον in ἁρμονία;
it is even one of its principles. Thus, ἁρμονία is the interval between
the ἄpiειρον and limit and at the same time it is the result of this
bond, viz. a κόσμος.
Anaxagoras, Pericles’ famous teacher, is the last philosopher
whom Wersinger examines. He represents the last step before Plato
and Aristotle in the question of ἁρμονία. For him, the universe (κόσ-
μος) is just a blend of every quality. Infinite and limits are not sep-
arated. But how is it possible to conceive identity when everything
is mixed? The answer is the theory of homeomery: following Barnes
[1982, 20], we can say that a property P is homeomerous if it is the
case that when x has P , every part of x has P . Anaxagoras thinks
that the infinite is indeed an infinity of parts. It is not extensively
infinite, but the number of parts is infinite; furthermore, opposite
qualities are extended into one another. So, the ἄpiειρον is relative,
a circularity that is always at the same time more and less big. The
whole universe is always between more and less: one could say ‘every-
thing is in everything’. Wersinger opportunely compares Anaxagoras’
philosophy with theater scenery in the fifth century BC. (what a spec-
tator sees depends on the place where he sits) and acoustics (you can
speak with a high-pitched voice to sound like people who scream from
a distance). According to Anaxagoras, we only see differences: the
more you look at microscopic level, the more things seem similar.
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Therefore, the infinite is a swirl of all differences. Anaxagoras intro-
duces nothingness into being. Parmenides thinks that there is no
infinite because being is limited. For Anaxagoras, there is not any
limit or else there would be nothingness.
To conclude, Wersinger describes the evolution of the notion
of ἁρμονία as ‘leaving multiplicity’ [335], which is not chronological,
because most of the Presocratic philosophers lived at the same time.
But each one belongs to Greek culture which begins with Homer and
variously interprets this heritage. For the famous blind poet, the
infinite corresponds to the invisibility of the bounds that bind the
circle. Empedocles invents the notion of unity. Heraclitus thinks
that invisibility is not enough to explain the ἄpiειρον: for him, it is
the expression of a unity which contains a certain multiplicity. Unity
is the ἁρμονία of multiplicity. Parmenides and the others try to
leave multiplicity: the continuous is identified with the indivisible.
For Parmenides, limit is the key; for Zeno, the ἄpiειρον is made of
more and less and multiplicity leads to nothingness, chaos. When
one conceives the ἄpiειρον as made of more and less, the notion of
interval is used. So it is easy to imagine that there are intermediate
positions between both extremities of the interval. And so ἁρμονία
is not represented as circle any more, but as an interval.
In sum, I would say that Wersinger’s work consists in trying to
isolate Presocratic philosophy from all the Pythagorean, Platonic, or
Aristotelian elements. These schools have studied the Presocratic
philosophers but have interpreted them in their own way. I person-
ally think that Wersinger succeeds in understanding how the ancient
Greeks elaborated this very difficult notion of ἁρμονία. Her method
is meticulous, her knowledge of Greek philology and philosophy indis-
putable. For other sciences like musicology, she has consulted great
specialists, which validates her results: the bibliography is complete
and the historiography well digested. Of course, this book is some-
times difficult to understand because of the complexity of the subject,
but the author tries to help her reader: each chapter concludes with
a clear recapitulation of the most important points of the argument.
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For all these reasons, I warmly recommend Wersinger’s remarkable
essay.3
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